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ABSTRACT 
The institution of university science research has evolved over 
the past century, from one of open science and free information to 
one of competition and jealously guarded intellectual property 
rights.  This iBrief analyzes the background factors driving the 
evolution of the institution of science, evaluates the net effects on 
the progress of science, and considers potential short-term 
solutions to alleviate the legal transaction costs necessary for 
scientific collaboration. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Negotiation, contracts, licensing, and lawyers in general only cause 
headaches for most university scientists.  Time spent doing paperwork or 
dealing with legal issues only serves to detract from time scientists would 
otherwise spend on valuable research.  Unfortunately for scientists, 
intellectual property law and policy changes over the course of the 20th 
Century, and particularly the last several decades, have produced a steady 
increase in transaction costs necessary to facilitate scientific inquiry.  These 
intellectual property transaction costs increase the expense of performing 
research and slow the pace of scientific progress.  This iBrief examines the 
legal and policy shifts impacting science, analyzes the resulting impact on 
the scientific endeavor, and advocates for one organization’s efforts to 
minimize the transaction costs embedded in scientific collaboration. 
I. PARADIGM SHIFTS IN UNIVERSITY SCIENCE RESEARCH 
¶2 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, famously 
constructs the concept of a paradigm shift to explain the process of 
scientific change.2 Kuhn describes the cyclic emergence of scientific 
novelties or discoveries which “subvert the existing tradition of scientific 
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practice.”3  The cycle begins with an initial set of beliefs through which 
“normal science” is conducted – for example, the Ptolemeic view of the 
earth-centered universe or the 18th Century Newtonian paradigm that light 
was made up of particles.  Upon discovering seemingly anomalous 
information that cannot be reconciled with the current paradigm, scientists 
are forced to reject previous assumptions and tightly held beliefs.  “A 
scientist’s world is qualitatively transformed [and] quantitatively enriched 
by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory.”4  The result of this shift, 
after the dust settles, is an entirely new paradigm.5 
¶3 Kuhn recognizes that social and cultural context may contribute to 
the success or failure of existing scientific paradigms.6  More than mere 
contribution, however, law and policy in the 20th century constructed and 
safeguarded a paradigm of open science7 through which university science 
research thrived.  Open science, as explained by sociologist Robert Merton, 
involves four behavioral norms which together fostered a collaborative 
scientific environment throughout much of the 20th Century.8  First, 
“universalism” means that the scientific enterprise should be open to all 
interested participants.9  Second, “communalism” means that ideas should 
be owned by no one and shared with all.10  Third, “disinterestedness” 
requires that the scientist should rise above his or her individual 
subjectivity.11  Finally, “organized skepticism” mandates that discoveries be 
subject to peer review.12   
¶4 As with every preceding scientific paradigm, however, open science 
is now under increased pressure to change in the wave of intellectual 
property law and policy developments of the past century.  In the emerging 
paradigm, science research is increasingly commercial instead of open, and 
increasingly proprietary instead of public.  While commercializing science 
has lowered some barriers, such as commercial access to medicine, it has 
raised others. 
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A. Erosion of Subject Matter Boundaries in Intellectual Property 
¶5 Both patent and copyright doctrines deny protection to certain types 
of raw information.  A “universally understood” tenet of U.S. copyright law 
is that “facts are not copyrightable.”13  Analogously, “[p]henomena of 
nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts” are not 
patentable.”14  These doctrines reveal a common understanding that certain 
types of information should not be owned by individuals but should instead 
remain universally accessible in the public domain.  The public domain 
provides a foundation of shared knowledge that is freely accessible to all 
and includes facts, abstract ideas, other unprotectable information, and all 
information for which the intellectual property protection has lapsed.15   
¶6 The longstanding policy supporting the public domain in U.S. 
intellectual property law is rooted in the Constitution.  The Constitution 
limits Congress’ power to grant creators “exclusive Right[s]” to their 
creations:  works must be “Writings [or] Discoveries” and the right must 
last only for “limited Times.”16  Thus, facts or abstract ideas do not qualify 
as “Writings [or] Discoveries.”  Furthermore, the “limited Times” 
requirement ensures that once a creator reaps sufficient rewards from a 
work, the work will enter and enrich the public domain.17   
¶7 Some forms of information, however, only exist in the public 
domain and are never exclusive.  Subject matter restrictions ensure that 
intellectual property protection applies only to “Writings and 
Discoveries,”18 not raw information.    In the copyright realm, “facts do not 
owe their origin to any individual” and thus “are part of the public domain 
available to every person.”19  Similarly, “[a]n idea itself is not 
patentable.”20  
¶8 The understanding that basic facts, natural phenomena, and other 
abstractions are not protectable forms of information has eroded 
significantly over the course of the 20th Century.  Before Parke-Davis & Co. 
v. H.K. Mulford Co.,21 patents for naturally occurring substances were 
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uniformly rejected.22  Parke-Davis altered this trend by upholding a patent 
granted for a purified naturally occurring substance, calling it “a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically.”23  This holding opened the door for 
patent coverage for isolated gene fragments.24  Next, Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty established that living organisms could constitute patentable 
subject matter.25  Finally, mathematical formulas and algorithms contained 
in otherwise patentable machines and processes now constitute patentable 
subject matter,26 even when the result of the process is as abstract and 
intangible as a number.27 
¶9 As in patent doctrine, the borders of copyright protection have also 
been stretched.  Although the inability to copyright facts has not been 
questioned,28 the copyrightability of compilations of facts, in the form of 
scientific databases for example, is a current matter of contention.  Under 
the 1976 Copyright Act, a compilation includes “a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of . . . data that are selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship.”29  The underlying facts, however, remain free 
and unprotected.   
¶10 In contrast, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union issued Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of 
databases, which established sui generis protection for the factual contents 
of databases, thus extending protection from mere compilations of facts to 
individual facts themselves.30  On several fronts, U.S. law is approaching a 
similar result.  First, several bills have proposed some form of database 
protection.31  Second, databases and their contents may already be guarded 
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under alternate legal theories including unfair competition, contractual 
reach-through agreements, and trade secrets.32   
¶11 By gradually increasing the domain of intellectual property 
protection to include previously unprotectable information, the potential 
economic value of raw scientific “building blocks” has dramatically 
increased.  The incentive to seek patents for substantially factual material, 
algorithmic processes, gene sequences, and other previously unprotectable 
subject matter has altered the incentive structure in scientific research.  
While “open science” inventors contented themselves with non-economic 
rewards of paper publication credit, esteem, self-gratification, and a certain 
degree of fame, today’s scientists must also seek patents to be successful.  
Patents represent economic value and may eventually benefit the public, but 
they also increase competitiveness among scientists and cause major 
reluctance to collaborate.   
B. Erosion of Government Commitment to the Public Domain 
¶12 To complement the constitutional commitment to enriching the 
public domain, long-term policy decisions have encouraged public 
availability of government resources.  By statute, all potentially 
copyrightable government-created works fall immediately into the public 
domain.33  Similarly, the government may only grant exclusive licenses to 
its own inventions when “the public will be served by the granting of the 
license,”34 preventing public resources from being used for exclusively 
private gain.   
¶13 Departing significantly from the expectation that government works 
should be available to the public for the common good, the 1980 Bayh-Dole 
Act35 ushered in a new era of privatized science.  The Act “codified” 
existing U.S. policy allowing scientists to patent their inventions, even 
when their research was government funded.36  The act sought to “promote 
widespread utilization of federally-sponsored inventions” and to “motivate 
private investors to pick up where government sponsors left off and 
transform new discoveries into commercial products.”37   
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¶14 Bayh-Dole presents a strong individual incentive to take all forms 
of scientific research to the stage of economic viability in the market by 
granting patent rights to inventors instead of to the government funding 
agency and allowing exclusive licensing for commercial development.  For 
federally funded research that is relatively “downstream,” the act 
encourages scientists to take the final step in creating publicly marketable 
and beneficial products.38  For research in only the initial phases of basic 
science, through which fundamental research tools are explored and 
developed, the act provides a somewhat perverse incentive to privatize at a 
very early stage of research: 
Universities have taken the opportunity to file patent applications on 
basic research discoveries, such as new DNA sequences, protein 
structures, and disease pathways, that are primarily valuable as inputs 
into further research, thereby accelerating the encroachment of the 
patent system into what was formerly the domain of open science.  
Even when they do not seek patents, universities often seek to preserve 
their expectations for profitable payoffs by imposing restrictions on 
the dissemination of research materials and reagents that might 
generate commercial value in subsequent research.39
¶15 Although the act provides incentives for commercialization and 
public distribution of useful scientific developments, the resulting extreme 
privatization and “deterioration in the culture of upstream research”40 
lessens the outright success of the legislation.   
¶16 There is, however, a counter-movement recognizing that publicly 
financed research results should be made available to everyone.  In 
September of 2004, The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) proposed a 
policy that would require all “scientific information arising from NIH-
funded research [to be] available in a timely fashion to other scientists, 
health care providers, students, teachers, and the many millions of 
Americans searching the web to obtain credible health-related 
information.”41   
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¶17 This proposition has not been adopted, due at least in part to “a 
quick and panicked response from scientific publishers”42 who would 
undoubtedly lose their significant market advantage if information was open 
to the public instead of restricted to subscription services.43  The U.S. 
House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, however, supported 
the proposed policy.  The Committee expressed strong concern that “there is 
insufficient public access to reports and data resulting from NIH-funded 
research” and that the situation, “which has been exacerbated by the 
dramatic rise in scientific journal subscription prices, is contrary to the best 
interests of the U.S. taxpayers who paid for this research.”44  Despite the 
public concern regarding the availability of scientific research, Bayh-Dole 
remains the controlling policy determining the allowable uses of the fruits 
of publicly funded research. 
II. BARRIERS TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
¶18 The increasing expansion of protectable subject matter from 
algorithms to gene fragments, combined with the vast increase of 
commercialization at all stages of research, has significantly increased both 
the economic incentive to participate in scientific research and the legal 
savvy needed to compete successfully in the market.  In effect, the scientific 
institution has shifted from one of collaborative development to one of 
competition and secrecy.   
A. Increased Transaction Costs in Conducting Science Research 
¶19 One highly notable consequence of the shifts in law and policy over 
the 20th century is the intellectual property protection available to 
biomedical research tools developed far upstream in the scientific pipeline.  
Before Bayh-Dole and the push to commercialize, “[u]npatented biomedical 
discoveries were freely incorporated in ‘downstream’ products for 
diagnosing and treating disease.”45  Today, a gene sequence may be 
patented at the first moment of isolation, even without knowledge of the 
specific role it will play in a commercial product.46   
¶20 While this development is undoubtedly of economic benefit to 
certain scientists, upstream protection of basic research tools vastly 
increases downstream costs to incorporate projects involving diverse and 
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possibly conflicting sets of rights.47  Upstream patents over gene sequences, 
for example, require complex transactional agreements at each subsequent 
stage of research.  Subsequent protectable inventions could include (1) an 
organism designed to host the patentable gene, (2) a protein produced by the 
host organism, (3) research databases, and (4) a marketable drug.  In effect, 
“[e]ach upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the 
road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of 
downstream biomedical innovation.”48  The cost of a downstream product 
compounds with each toll.  The increased price the public pays outweighs 
the initial gain to the few upstream scientists. 
¶21 Furthermore, these “concurrent fragments” create what Heller and 
Eisenberg call a “tragedy of the anticommons” when “multiple owners each 
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an 
effective privilege of use.”49  In an atmosphere of competition and secrecy, 
granting exclusive rights over upstream products will more likely lead to 
market shortages than to productive bargaining.50   
¶22 Universities, federal laboratories, hospitals, and private research 
institutions often wish to use materials developed elsewhere.51  The 
institutional and legal mechanism developed to cope with the potential 
tangle of intellectual property rights over research tools – including genes, 
cell lines, and other biological products – is a type of contractual 
arrangement known as materials transfer agreements (“MTAs”).52  MTAs 
are binding contracts that provide a common understanding of how the 
materials may be used by the parties.53    
¶23 MTAs define the “material” in question and may include a broad 
range of terms and restrictions.  These may stipulate allowable uses of the 
material, define allowable uses and ownership of derivative materials, 
require assignment or compulsory licensing of downstream intellectual 
property, limit academic credit derived from the material, control future 
transfer of the material, and a host of other restrictions.54  
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B. Result of Heightened Transaction Costs 
¶24 Negotiating an MTA is a time consuming and costly procedure, 
even between collegial and friendly parties.55  Although “many transfers 
within academia are still informal . . . use of an MTA is recommended so 
that disputes about use do not arise.”56  Even if a material is offered for free, 
universities warn scientists that “informal transfers done without MTAs 
confer little protection on either the provider or the recipient.”57  In the 
worst situations, an unwilling or hostile party can delay a transfer or require 
unreasonable terms.  Such delays may cost scientists research windows, 
grant opportunities, and generally delay the progress of research.58  
¶25 All time spent negotiating MTAs detracts from time spent 
performing valuable research and slows the flow of information between 
scientists.  Various empirical studies confirm the prevalence of the problem.  
For instance, Eric Campbell’s study on data withholding among academic 
geneticists in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 
forty-seven percent of academic geneticists surveyed who had asked “other 
faculty for additional information, data, or materials regarding published 
research reported that at least one of their requests had been denied in the 
preceding 3 years.”59  Because of the transaction overhead, scientists simply 
choose not to share materials.60 
¶26 Whether a scientist chooses to collaborate using an MTA or refuses 
to put in the time and effort to do so, the progress of science suffers.  Using 
an MTA delays real science by imposing legal transaction costs.  Refusing 
to transfer materials to avoid such transaction costs slows the progress of 
science by denying others the use of valuable scientific resources.  Under 
imposing pressures to develop marketable and profitable inventions, the 
institutional and legal barriers to the flow of scientific information only 
serve to increase the barriers to scientific innovation. 
III. TOWARDS EFFICIENCY THROUGH STANDARD LICENSING 
¶27 The tangle of downstream intellectual property rights created by 
“concurrent fragments” and “tollbooth[s] on the road to product 
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development” will not become untangled without significant legislative 
reform.  Rather, immediate efforts to alleviate the high transaction costs of 
collaboration in science research must focus on simplifying the process of 
sharing.  If scientists could use an MTA to share valuable materials without 
significant effort or expense, they would have much greater incentive to do 
so.   
A. Existing MTA Simplification Efforts 
¶28 The most significant effort to simplify MTAs has been the creation 
of the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (“UBMTA”).  The 
U.S. Public Health Service and representatives from academia and industry 
created the UBMTA “to address concerns about contractual obligations 
imposed by some MTAs and to simplify the process of sharing proprietary 
materials among public and nonprofit organizations.”61  The ideal result of 
a UBMTA would be to “reduce the administrative burden of sharing 
materials as investigators come to rely on common acceptance of its terms 
by cooperating organizations.”62  Since 1995, over 250 institutions have 
undertaken efforts to adopt the UBMTA into use.63 
¶29 Despite the numerous signatories pledging to use the standard 
agreement, the UBMTA has delivered only “limited success.”64  Instead of 
adhering to a standard agreement, many institutions have merely 
“substituted their own form agreement for the UBMTA,” adding “more 
restrictive” terms.65  Critics see these deviations as “unsurprising” because 
“university technology transfer officials . . . tend to see their primary job as 
bringing licensing revenue into the university,”66 not lowering the 
transaction costs of collaboration.  Furthermore, even the creators of the 
UBMTA realize that it “may not be appropriate for every material 
transfer,”67 conceding the potential need for contractual customization.   
¶30 Customization of the UBMTA for unique materials, particular 
parties, or for more restrictive terms undermines the entire purpose of a 
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standard contract.  Customization requires negotiations, new understanding 
of the changes, bulky bureaucratic involvement, and results in many of the 
original problems introduced by MTAs.   
B. The Science Commons Approach:  Configurable Digital Licensing 
¶31 Creative Commons, a non-profit organization that provides 
standard, digital licenses for online copyrightable media, recognizes both 
the challenges inherent in standardizing MTAs and the potential economic 
and social benefits of doing so successfully.68  Creative Commons offers a 
free, online content licensing service to allow internet users to share photos, 
writing, music, and the like.69  The licenses alter the standard contours of 
copyright law to allow sharing of a work under certain conditions – such as 
for non-commercial use only or requiring proper attribution credit – while 
allowing the creator to retain a “some rights reserved” version of 
copyright.70   
¶32 The two most unique components of Creative Commons licensing 
are two features lacking in the UBMTA efforts.  First, the license is 
configurable for different situations.  Without sacrificing license 
compatibility and interoperability, a user may choose from a range of 
restrictions such as creation of derivative works, use for non-commercial 
purposes only, and subsequent distribution restrictions.71  Second, Creative 
Commons publishes the license in a digital format, by which search engines 
like Yahoo and others may locate material offered under a Creative 
Commons license.72   
¶33 Science Commons, one of Creative Commons’ newest and most 
innovative projects recognizes that “a standard, open framework for 
managing material transfer can catalyze innovation.”73  Science Commons 
seeks to apply the Creative Commons licensing model to the creation of a 
new version of a uniform MTA.74   
¶34 A Science Commons MTA must include sufficiently standard terms 
to decrease the transaction costs of collaboration while maintaining an array 
of configurable terms diverse enough to avoid the splintering effect 
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experienced by the UBMTA.  Like the suite of Creative Commons licenses, 
a Science Commons MTA must define the material in question and allow 
investigators and technology managers to select more or less restrictive 
terms of use, downstream requirements for derivative works, and attribution 
requirements.  The range of configurable options must derive from the 
existing range of MTAs used by scientists and universities today.  Also like 
the Creative Commons licenses, a Science Commons MTA would function 
most efficiently in a digital format.  If scientists could license materials to 
colleagues or search for materials from others with no more effort than 
several clicks of a mouse, they would be less likely to withhold the 
“information, data, and materials . . . vital . . . to the efficient advancement 
of science.”75 
¶35 While the Creative Commons licensing system has achieved major 
recognition and use,76 application of the Creative Commons licensing 
model to scientific transactions will present major challenges.  Most 
fundamentally, the Creative Commons license involves copyrighted works 
while a Science Commons license would involve a transfer of physical 
goods or information not subject to copyright.  This difference, at the very 
least, will require significant re-tooling of the Creative Commons licensing 
machinery.  Furthermore, Creative Commons licensing involves only the 
simple case of an individual licensing creative works for use on the Internet.  
Science Commons, in contrast, involves significantly more complex and 
sophisticated parties.  As large institutions, universities are subject to laws, 
rules, policies, and practices that make even the smallest of changes 
difficult and time consuming.  Even more restricting to universities are 
economic considerations.  Technology transfer offices, already concerned 
with the proverbial bottom line, will avoid changes that present even the 
appearance of endangering the university’s revenue stream.  Finally, while 
Creative Commons had no competing licenses to consider, Science 
Commons is entering a domain occupied by existing licensing procedures. 
¶36 Science Commons must harness these institutional challenges to its 
advantage.  With many existing relationships with universities and their 
technology transfer offices, Science Commons must continue to facilitate 
dialogue about transactional barriers to science.  Instead of fighting the 
existing licensing systems, Science Commons should use existing university 
technology transfer infrastructure as a starting point for launching efficient 
digital licenses.  Like any development of a community standard, adoption 
of new licensing standards must be a community effort. 
                                                     
75 Campbell, supra note 59, at 473. 
76 As of November 2005, a generic web search for “Creative Commons” yields 
almost 60 million websites, many of which are Creative Commons licensed 
works. 
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 4 
¶37 When digital licensing of scientific tools and information can 
accommodate a wide range of contractual possibility while still maintaining 
compatibility and interoperability, scientists will hopefully chose to 
collaborate in the spirit of open science while still preserving their 
intellectual property rights crucial to competing in the modern scientific 
paradigm.  Like any paradigm shift, the transition from open science to 
intellectual property science involves an inevitable degree of chaos and 
experimentation.  Although the success of Science Commons is yet to be 
determined, it must be applauded for fostering dialogue focusing on 
minimizing the problematic aspects of the new paradigm. 
CONCLUSION 
¶38 The broad expansion of protectable intellectual property subject 
matter and the commercialization of science may be inevitable 
characteristics of modern science.  Unreasonably high barriers to research 
collaboration and the scientific progress, however, are not inevitable factors 
to be taken lightly.  If nothing else, the UBMTA effort has highlighted the 
common frustrations caused by the complicated and expensive process of 
materials transfer and the community support available to standardization 
efforts.  Of the modern efforts to standardize, Science Commons approach 
to licensing, combining standardized digital licensing with fluid and 
customizable terms of agreement, has the best chance of success.  When 
implemented, a Science Commons license could remove barriers to 
collaboration and increase the general pace of scientific collaboration and 
progress.   
 
